Search Judgments

The Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (MVA) – An appeal by the Insurance Company challenged an award by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Vellore, issued under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (MVA). The Tribunal had awarded Rs. 23,50,000/- to the mother of an 18-year-old student who died when the lorry he was travelling in capsized due to the driver’s negligence.

The appellant Insurance Company denied liability, citing contradictions in the FIR and the claimant’s evidence regarding the deceased’s status—initially mentioned as a ‘coolie cum owner of goods,’ later as a cleaner during holidays.

Hindu Law – The Hindu Gains of Learning Act, 1930 – Sections 2(b), 2(c), and 3 – This appeal contested the trial court’s dismissal of a partition claim over ‘B-schedule’ property, while a preliminary decree for ‘A-schedule’ (ancestral) property was granted. The plaintiff (father) asserted that ‘B-schedule’ property, though purchased by his son (Defendant 1), was acquired using joint family funds.

Defendant 1 contended that ‘B-schedule’ was his self-acquired property, purchased with compensation from an overseas work accident and a bank loan. The appellate court focused on whether ‘B-schedule’ originated from a joint family nucleus.

Information Technology Act, 2000 – Section 67; Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS) – Sections 352, 353(2); Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) – Section 187 – The appellants, arrested for offenses under the IT Act, 2000, and BNS, 2023, were granted regular bail by a Magistrate who also rejected a police custody request, citing sufficient investigation and material recovery. The State’s subsequent revision was allowed by the Sessions Judge, directing police custody, a decision affirmed by the High Court, both overlooking the existing bail order.

The Supreme Court underscored the Magistrate’s exclusive discretion in police custody matters under BNSS Section 187, stressing that such reasoned orders should not be ordinarily interfered with by revisional courts without gross perversity. Granting police custody to an accused already on bail was deemed an indirect and impermissible cancellation of bail.

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (Cr.P.C.) – Section 319; Indian Penal Code (IPC) – Sections 147, 148, 149, 302; Arms Act – Sections 25(1-B)A/26/27/35 – This judgment addresses appeals arising from a murder case where certain accused were summoned under Section 319 Cr.P.C. Initially, nine persons were named in the FIR, but the chargesheet was filed against only three. Following eyewitness depositions, the first informant successfully applied under Section 319 Cr.P.C. to summon three additional co-accused, who had been dropped by the police.

The Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrP) Section 340 – The Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) Section 379 – The Supreme Court heard a wife’s petition seeking transfer of a perjury application filed by her husband under Section 340 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC) and Section 379 of the Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS). The proceedings ultimately expanded to consider an application for divorce, invoking Article 142 of the Constitution of India, on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage. The couple, married on January 28, 2012, cohabited for merely 65 days and have since been separated for over a decade, engaging in more than 40 litigations against each other.

Despite mediation attempts, reconciliation proved impossible, leading to deep-seated bitterness and no prospect of cohabitation.

The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) Section 47 – This case concerns an appeal challenging the High Court’s order, which affirmed the maintainability of an application filed under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC).

The appellants, as decree-holders, had obtained a partial decree for declaration of title over Suit Hal Plot No. 53. They initiated Execution Petition No.

The Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) Section 366 – The Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act) Sections 5(l) read with 6(l) – Criminal Appeal challenging a conviction under the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) Section 366 and the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act) Sections 5(l) read with 6(l). The appellant was accused of kidnapping and penetrative sexual assault of a 17-year-old minor victim, with whom he allegedly had a consensual love affair.

The central issue was the victim’s age. The prosecution relied on a Headmaster’s certificate stating the victim’s birth on 21.11.2003, but the basis for this was unclear, and no other conclusive proof was submitted.

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) – Order VI Rule 4, Section 151; Specific Relief Act, Section 31; Tamil Nadu Court-Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1955; Indian Evidence Act – This appeal arose from a trial court’s judgment that set aside a sale deed and agreement, while suo motu directing the plaintiff to repay Rs. 5 lakhs with interest to the second defendant. The plaintiff alleged a loan of Rs. 5 lakhs from the second defendant, for which a sale agreement (Ex.A3) in favour of the first defendant and a Power of Attorney (Ex.A2) to the second defendant were taken as security.

Indian Evidence Act, 1872 – Section 68, 91, 92, 101, 102, 103 – Transfer of Property Act, 1882 – Section 3, 59 – Registration Act, 1908 – Section 58, 59 – This appeal challenged a trial court’s decree for money recovery based on a mortgage deed. The plaintiff (respondent) asserted the defendant (appellant) borrowed Rs. 10 lakhs and executed a registered mortgage deed. The defendant vehemently denied this, claiming the deed was fabricated and forged, and that his title deed was misused.

Hindu Succession Act, 1956 Section 8 – A Second Appeal challenged concurrent judgments dismissing a suit for partition and declaration that a settlement deed was void. The plaintiff, a son, claimed the suit properties were ancestral, inherited from his grandfather (Arunachala Nadar), and sought a ¼ share, contesting his father’s (1st defendant) settlement deed in favour of his brother (3rd defendant).

The defendants asserted that after Arunachala Nadar died intestate in 1958, his sons, including the 1st defendant, orally partitioned the ancestral properties, with the suit properties allotted to the 1st defendant. This made him the absolute owner, empowering him to execute the settlement deed.