Search Judgments

Income-tax Act, 1961 (I-T Act) – Section 143(2), 143(3), 271(1)(c), 281, Second Schedule (Rules 2, 11, 16, 51); Transfer of Property Act, 1882 – Section 58(f); Registration Act, 1908 – Section 17(1)(b), 17(1)(i); Chit Funds Act, 1982 – This case concerned a dispute over an equitable mortgage created by an assessee whose property was attached by the Tax Recovery Officer (TRO) for tax arrears. The assessee received a Rule 2 notice under the Second Schedule of the I-T Act on 26.02.2016 for outstanding tax dues. Subsequently, on 16.11.2016, the assessee mortgaged the property to the petitioner. When the TRO proceeded with auctioning the attached property, the petitioner objected, claiming a prior mortgage.

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (the Act) – Section 9 – A Full Bench of the Madras High Court clarified the scope and interpretation of the word ‘enforced’ as used in Section 9 of the Act, which allows for interim measures post-arbitral award but before its enforcement. Conflicting views had emerged, with one Division Bench interpreting ‘enforced’ as ‘enforceable’, thereby limiting the timeframe for seeking such relief.

However, a learned Single Judge and earlier rulings, including the Bombay High Court’s decision in Dirk India Private Limited, upheld by the Supreme Court in Hindustan Construction Corporation Limited, interpreted ‘enforced’ to mean ‘until the complete satisfaction of the award’. The Full Bench affirmed that the plain and literal meaning of the term must be adopted, rejecting any interpretation that restricts the legislative intent to provide robust interim protection.

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) – Order 38 Rule 9; Income Tax Act, 1961 – This case concerns two Civil Revision Petitions challenging lower court orders related to attachment before judgment. The petitioner (plaintiff) had filed a suit to recover Rs. 98,00,000 based on an alleged sale agreement. The respondent (defendant) disputed the agreement, claiming it was forged from documents provided for a Rs.

Indian Stamp Act, 1899 (Stamp Act) – Section 2(24), Section 6, Article 58(a)(ii), Article 62(e); Indian Contract Act, 1872 – Section 2(d) – This judgment concerns a writ appeal by the State challenging the stamp duty levied on a “Transfer of Trusteeship Declaration” deed. The deed facilitated the transfer of management and properties from the Christu Kula Charitable Trust to the National Missionary Society of India, a necessary step as the original trustees were unable to continue their operations, in accordance with the original trust deed.

The primary legal contention was whether the document constituted a “Settlement” under Article 58(a)(ii) or a transfer between trustees under Article 62(e) of the Stamp Act. While the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority had imposed higher stamp duty classifying it as a “Settlement,” the learned Single Judge reclassified it under Article 62(e), finding no ‘consideration’ or ‘transfer of ownership’.

Indian Evidence Act, 1872 – Sections 91, 92; Specific Relief Act, 1963 – Section 22 – The plaintiffs appealed the dismissal of their suit seeking specific performance of a sale agreement dated 07.10.2013, or alternatively, a refund of Rs. 15,00,000/- advance. The defendant contended the registered agreement (Ex.A1) was never intended as a genuine sale, but merely security for loans advanced by Mylsamy, father of the 1st plaintiff.

The Court examined if Ex.A1 was a genuine sale agreement or a security document.

Workman’s Compensation Act, 1923 Section 3 – This appeal concerns a compensation claim for Panganti Suresh, a driver who died in a fatal accident on 10.09.2004 while employed by Respondent No. 5. His legal representative filed a claim under the Workman’s Compensation Act, 1923.

The Commissioner for Workmen’s Compensation awarded Rs.

Income Tax Act, 1961 (IT Act) – Section 269ST and 271DA – The Civil Revision Petition challenged a trial court order requiring the petitioner (plaintiff) to provide their PAN number to the defendants and forward suit documents to the Income Tax Department. The petitioner had filed a suit for recovery of Rs. 80,00,000, allegedly lent in cash on 21.06.2016, based on a promissory note.

The petitioner argued that IT Act Section 269ST, which prohibits cash transactions of Rs.

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC) – Order 8 Rule 1, Order 8 Rule 6-A- Commercial Courts Act, 2015 – Section 12-A – The Civil Revision Petition challenged a Commercial Court’s order returning a counter claim filed by the defendants as non-maintainable during the trial stage. The original commercial suit for money recovery had seen the Supreme Court set aside a plaint strike-off, granting liberty to parties to file “additional pleadings.”

The defendants initially filed a written statement on 10.09.2024 under this liberty. Subsequently, after the issues in the suit were framed on 21.06.2025, they filed another written statement on 24.06.2025, which included a counter claim. The defendants argued that the Supreme Court’s liberty allowed this, and the 120-day limit for written statements in Commercial Courts did not apply to counter claims.

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (MVA) – Section 166 – This Civil Miscellaneous Appeal arose from a Motor Accident Claims Tribunal judgment awarding Rs. 1,13,81,664/- with 7.5% interest for the death of T. Vivekananthan in a motor accident on 05.04.2010. The deceased, a Senior Zonal Manager aged 43, was earning Rs.

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (MVA) – Sections 2(21) and 10(2)(d) – This Civil Miscellaneous Appeal challenged an award by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Chennai, granting compensation to the legal heirs of a deceased driver who died in a road accident. The appellant, an insurance company, contested the Tribunal’s finding of negligence against the 4th respondent (the offending vehicle’s driver) and the quantum of compensation.

The appellant argued that the deceased himself was negligent, or alternatively, the 4th respondent lacked a proper badge to drive a transport vehicle, constituting a policy breach. It also contended the FIR was not conclusive and the compensation awarded for notional income, future prospects, multiplier, and loss of consortium was excessive.