Search Judgments

(Building Plan Permission & Consultation under Town and Country Planning Act)

This Writ Petition challenged an order dated 15.04.2015, which locked and sealed parts of a building for alleged lack of building plan permission under Section 49 of the Tamil Nadu Town and Country Planning Act, 1971. The petitioner contended that once planning permission is granted by local authorities, a separate Section 49 permission is not required, a position the respondent acknowledged in their counter-affidavit. The Court, referencing the Division Bench decision in (Tamil Nadu Unaided Polytechnic Management Association v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2018 (4) CTC 129) reiterated that applicants do not need Section 49 permission from the Town Planning Authority if local authority permission is obtained. Instead, the local authority (Executive Authority of the Panchayat) is mandated to engage in a written consultative process with the Joint/Deputy Director of Town and Country Planning.

For permissions granted without prior consultation, the Division Bench directed the local authority to forward papers to the Town Planning Authority for review and advice.

(Validity of Corporate Guarantees & Status of Financial Creditor under IBC)

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (Sections 5(7), 5(8), 43, 45, 62, 66) - Companies Act, 2013 (Section 186) - Maharashtra Stamp Act, 1958 - This appeal challenged the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) and National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) orders that rejected SBI Consortium's (appellants) claims as 'financial creditors' of Reliance Infratel Limited (CD). The dispute centered on the validity and enforceability of corporate guarantees executed by the CD to secure loans extended to its group entities, Reliance Communications Ltd. (RCOM) and Reliance Telecom Ltd. (RTL), by the appellant consortium.

The NCLT and NCLAT held that the guarantees were questionable due to their timing, alleged non-disclosure in financial statements, improper verification, and insufficient stamping, thereby denying the appellants status as financial creditors and directing Committee of Creditors (CoC) reconstitution. The Supreme Court examined three issues: whether corporate guarantees constitute "financial debt," if claims were properly rejected, and if tribunal findings warranted interference.

(Right to Education and Neighbourhood Schools Admissions)

This judgment primarily refers to Article 21A of the Indian Constitution, the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 (RTE Act, 2009) (specifically Sections 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, 12, 38), and the U.P Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Rules, 2011 (UP RTE Rules, 2011) (particularly Rules 7 and 8) - The case concerns a 'neighbourhood school' that denied admission to a student selected by the Basic Education Department, Uttar Pradesh, for pre-primary class under the RTE Act. The High Court had directed the school to grant admission, asserting that schools cannot override the State Government's selection. The petitioner school challenged this decision.

The Supreme Court reiterated the constitutional and statutory obligation of neighbourhood schools to admit students forwarded by the State Government.

(Criminal Appeal (Murder, Abduction, Theft, Evidence Destruction)

The Indian Penal Code, 1860 Sections 302, 364, 404, 201 read with Section 34 And  The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 Sections 25 and 27 - The appellants (original accused nos. 2 and 4) were convicted by the Trial Court for the murder of the deceased, whose charred remains were found. The High Court affirmed this conviction, relying on circumstantial evidence including the deceased being "last seen" with the accused, a clear motive attributed primarily to Accused No. 1 (the deceased's brother) due to financial disputes, and the discovery of material objects.

(Deer Translocation and Wildlife Management)

The Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972, Section 38H(6) - The dispute concerns the translocation of hundreds of deer from A.N. Jha Deer Park, Hauz Khas, New Delhi. A Central Empowered Committee (CEC) report found the park's ecological carrying capacity to be approximately 38 deer. The Central Zoo Authority (CZA) had already cancelled the park's "mini zoo" recognition due to non-compliance with management norms and an expired license.

(Land Acquisition for National Highway & Environmental Clearance)

The National Highways Act, 1956 (Sections 3A, 3D, 3E, 3G, 3H), Environment (Protection) Act, 1986, and EIA Notification, 2006 - Petitioners challenged a Section 3D notification and an order for land acquisition for National Highway 948A. Key contentions were the absence of environmental clearance (EC) prior to the 3D notification, citing Project Director vs. P.V. Krishnamurthy, and non-consideration of their objections.

(Forest Rights Claim)

The Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006 (Act, 2006), specifically Sections 2(c), 2(o), and 3. Reference was also made to the Madras Forest Act, 1882 - The appellants challenged the rejection of their application by the District Collector, affirmed by the Writ Court, seeking to declare rights over 291.60 acres of land classified as 'Reserved Forest'. They contended their ancestors had possessed and cultivated the land for over 75 years, qualifying them as 'Other Traditional Forest Dwellers' under the Act, 2006, entitled to forest rights.

The respondent argued that the appellants failed to provide evidence of primary residence and dependency on the forest land for bona fide livelihood for at least three generations (75 years) prior to 13.12.2005.

(Specific Performance of Sale Agreement)

The Specific Relief Act, 1963, Section 16(c), which requires a plaintiff seeking specific performance to prove readiness and willingness to perform their contractual obligations. The plaintiff (vendee) sued for specific performance of an unregistered sale agreement dated 24.09.2009 for Rs.27,00,000/-, having paid a total advance of Rs.9,50,000/- to the defendants (vendors).

Despite the defendants' denial of the agreement and advance, forensic evidence conclusively proved their genuine signatures and thumb impressions on the contract documents and endorsements. The Trial Court upheld the agreements' validity but denied specific performance, granting only refund of advance. It held that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate readiness and willingness by not paying the balance consideration within the stipulated time.

On appeal, the High Court ruled that the defendants' false denial, which necessitated the plaintiff to prove the contract's validity through litigation, negated the "time is of the essence" argument.

Child Custody (Habeas Corpus Petition)

Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956, Section 6 - The petitioner (mother) filed a habeas corpus petition seeking the production of her 3-year-old daughter, Minor Bhavana. She alleged that her husband (R3/father) illegally detained the child since August 2025 after domestic abuse led to her expulsion from the matrimonial home, denying her access to the child.

The court acknowledged Section 6 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956, which generally states that a mother should have custody of a child under five. However, the primary focus was on the child's welfare and whether there was actual illegal detention.

(Preventive Detention under Goondas Act)

The Tamil Nadu Preventive Detention Act, 1982 (Tamil Nadu Act 14 of 1982) Section 2(f), branding them as 'Goondas'. The detenus were co-accused in Cr.No.490 of 2025, facing charges under The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita Scheme, 2023 (BNSS) Sections 61(2), 126(2), 137(2), and 310(2).

The petitioners argued that the detaining authority failed to apply its mind by relying on a non-identical bail order (Crl.O.P.No.25228 of 2024 dated 14.10.2024) to predict the likelihood of the detenus being enlarged on bail. They highlighted that the comparable case involved less severe offenses (robbery) than those alleged against the detenus (conspiracy, kidnapping, and dacoity with arms), which are "far graver."

The Additional Public Prosecutor contended that minor differences in offenses should not vitiate subjective satisfaction and that recent detentions in some cases warranted no immediate intervention.