Search Judgments

The Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act, 2012 Sections 5(l) read with 6 – The Indian Penal Code (IPC) Section 366 – This Criminal Appeal challenged the conviction and sentence of the appellant under Section 366 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and Sections 5(l) read with 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act, 2012. The appellant was sentenced to 5 years rigorous imprisonment (RI) under IPC and 20 years RI under the POCSO Act.

The case involved a 16-year-old victim and a 17-year-old accused who were in a romantic relationship. The victim voluntarily left her home to marry the appellant against her parents’ wishes, after which sexual relations occurred.

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (MVA) – Sections 140, 163-A, 166, and Schedule II. – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) – Sections 279 and 337 – This Civil Miscellaneous Appeal was filed by an insurance company challenging a Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (MACT) award. The claimants, legal heirs of the deceased, initially filed for compensation under Sections 140 and 166 of the MVA, subsequently amending it to Section 163-A. An FIR was registered against the deceased, who was found responsible for the accident.

Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 Sections 3(2)(v), 3(2), 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s); The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) Section 227 –  The Supreme Court heard an appeal challenging the High Court’s dismissal of a discharge plea under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC). The High Court had affirmed the Trial Court’s decision to frame charges against the accused, including those under the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (SCST Act), and various sections of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC).

The case involved an incident where public officials were restrained and assaulted during an event. The primary contention before the Supreme Court was the validity of charges under the SCST Act, specifically Sections 3(2)(v) and 3(2)(va), which require the accused’s knowledge of the victim’s caste identity and caste-motivated intent.

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC) – Section 100 and 103 – This Second Appeal challenged concurrent findings of the lower courts in a suit for permanent and mandatory injunction. The plaintiff (respondent) sought to remove eight stone pillars and a barbed wire fence allegedly erected by the 1st defendant (appellant) on his property of 5.830 cents. The plaintiff claimed title through a registered sale deed and proved possession.

The 1st defendant disputed the plaintiff’s entitlement to the full 5.830 cents, arguing his vendor owned only 5.5 cents, and contended a suit for bare injunction was unsustainable without a declaration of title, citing a “cloud” over ownership.

Interest Act, 1978 – Section 3(1) and 3(3); Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) – Section 34; Constitution of India – Article 12 – The case involved T.I. Raju, a government contractor, who completed a Sewage Treatment Plant work by 2014. Despite the principal sum of Rs. 86,64,846/- being due, it was only released in 2016 following a High Court writ petition.

(Land Acquisition for Harijan Welfare Scheme)

The Tamil Nadu Acquisition of Land for Harijan Welfare Schemes Act, 1978 (Act 31 of 1978) Section 4(1) - The petitioner claimed ownership of land in S.No.78/1C, acquired in 1997 for a Harijan Welfare Scheme. She contended that pattas issued to 33 individuals were subsequently cancelled due to their ineligibility. Initially seeking a declaration of lapse under Section 24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (Act 30 of 2013), she later argued for de-notification, asserting the scheme became unworkable, citing the precedent in K.N.Ramachandran v. Muthumari where a specific scheme failed due to ineligible beneficiaries.

Constitution of India – Article 14 and 16 – The petitioners aggrieved by the non-inclusion of their names in the revised provisional seniority list for the post of Graduate Teacher/BT Assistant. The grievance stemmed from the alleged failure to award marks for their Teacher Eligibility Test (TET) qualification, as per G.O. Ms. No.147, School Education (TRB) Dept., dated 22.8.2023.

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Section 11 & 34 – This judgment addresses the interpretation of Clause 23 of a contract agreement and whether it constitutes a valid arbitration agreement. The core issue is whether courts were justified in setting aside an arbitral award based on the finding that Clause 23 was not an arbitration agreement, especially considering the arbitrator’s appointment occurred before the 2015 amendments to the Arbitration and Conciliation Act.

The appellant was awarded construction work by the respondent, with disputes arising over non-payment of escalation costs. The appellant filed Section 11 application, and a Single Judge appointed an arbitrator.

Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923 – This case involves a Civil Revision Petition (CRP(MD)No.1314 of 2011) and a Civil Miscellaneous Appeal (C.M.A(MD)No.1351 of 2012) arising from an order by the Deputy Commissioner of Labour (Commissioner for Workmen Compensation), Tirunelveli, in W.C.No.49 of 2008.

The company, Subam Papers (P) Ltd., filed the CRP challenging the dismissal of its application (unnumbered I.A.) seeking a re-evaluation of the workman’s disability by a medical board. The company argued the initial disability assessment of 52% was too high and required further expert assessment.

The Civil Miscellaneous Appeal was filed by the same company, challenging the compensation awarded to the workman for injuries sustained during employment.

Hindu Succession (Tamil Nadu Amendment) Act, 1989 (Tamil Nadu Act 1 of 1990) – Section 29-A – This appeal challenged a preliminary decree granting plaintiffs (daughters) a 3/4th share in ‘A’ and ‘B’ Schedule properties. The plaintiffs contended that all properties, including those acquired by their father (1st defendant), were joint family assets purchased from the income of extensive ancestral lands (34 Acres). They asserted their coparcenary rights under the Act, having married after its commencement.

The 2nd defendant (another daughter and appellant) argued that certain properties (A-Schedule Item Nos.