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Res Judicata, Order II Rule 2 CPC, and Scope of Second Appeal

This appeal involves the interpretation and application of **Sections 11, 100, 105, and Order II Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC)**, concerning the maintainability of a subsequent suit. Parvatewwa (plaintiff) initially filed **Suit-I (2002)** seeking a declaration that an adoption deed was null and void and for a consequential injunction. This suit was eventually dismissed on grounds of limitation. While the appeal for Suit-I was pending, Parvatewwa instituted **Suit-II (2007)**, seeking a declaration of ownership and recovery of possession for the same property.

Specific Performance of Agreement to Sell

This appeal concerns a suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell agricultural land, challenging the High Court's affirmation of a decree for specific performance.

The case involves the application of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, concerning lis pendens, and Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, regarding the scope of second appeals.

Plaintiff Anil Kishore Seth (now heirs) entered into an unregistered agreement to sell with Russi Fisheries (P) Ltd. (Defendant No.

(Withdrawal of Electricity Duty Exemption to Captive Power Generators)

The Bombay Electricity Duty Act, 1958 (Act), Section 5A (Power to exempt from electricity duty) - Article 14 of the Constitution of India (Equality and non-arbitrariness) - This case challenges the validity of notifications issued by the State of Maharashtra that withdrew electricity duty exemptions previously granted to industries operating captive power plants. The State, exercising powers under Section 5A of the Act, had initially granted exemptions from electricity duty to captive power generators since 1994 to encourage self-sufficiency. However, notifications dated April 1, 2000, and April 4, 2001, were subsequently issued, withdrawing or modifying these exemptions, leading to industries being liable for duty for an intervening period.

The High Court had invalidated these notifications, citing discrimination, arbitrariness, and insufficient justification. The State appealed to the Supreme Court, asserting its statutory authority to withdraw concessions based on public interest, specifically due to budgetary deficits, and arguing against the applicability of promissory estoppel or legitimate expectation.

(Murder (Circumstantial Evidence Case)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) – Section 302 (Murder) - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.P.C.) – Sections 161(1), 207, 313 - This criminal appeal challenged a conviction under Section 302 IPC for murder. The prosecution's case rested on circumstantial evidence: motive (a loan dispute), the appellant and deceased being last seen together, and recovery of a knife and deceased's belongings from the appellant. 

The trial court convicted the appellant, imposing a life sentence. The appellate court, however, found that while a homicidal death was established, the prosecution failed to prove motive beyond a loan transaction, lacking clear evidence of enmity leading to murder.

 
The 'last seen' witnesses (PW8, PW9, PW13) were deemed unreliable due to inconsistencies, improbable coincidences, belated dispatch of statements to the Magistrate (after arrest), and lack of corroboration.

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC) – Order 18 Rule 17, Order 8 Rule 1A(4), Order 41 Rule 27; Transfer of Property Act, 1882 – Section 54 – The plaintiff filed O.S.No.51 of 2019 seeking a permanent injunction, asserting ownership of properties purchased from the first defendant through registered sale deeds. The defendants contended that these sale deeds were executed not to transfer title, but as collateral security for high-interest loans taken by the first defendant. They claimed the plaintiff later admitted this collateral nature in private discussions and mobile phone conversations.

After trial evidence concluded, the defendants sought to re-open evidence and recall the plaintiff (P.W.1) for further cross-examination on these alleged admissions.

The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC) Section 14, 32A – The Supreme Court deliberated on appeals challenging the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal’s (NCLAT) decision to not interfere with the National Company Law Tribunal’s (NCLT) refusal to adjudicate liquidators’ applications. These applications contested provisional attachment orders under the Prohibition of Benami Property Transactions Act, 1988 (“Benami Act”).

The NCLT and NCLAT had ruled they lacked jurisdiction, asserting the Benami Act is a self-contained code for confiscation of tainted property. They held that the moratorium under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (“IBC”) (Section 14) protects against creditor actions, not sovereign proceedings like those under the Benami Act, and NCLT’s residuary jurisdiction (Section 60(5) of IBC) does not extend to reviewing such public law actions.

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC) – Section 7, 10A, 12A, 31, 62 – Power Trust (Appellant), promoter of Hiranmaye Energy Ltd. (Corporate Debtor), challenged the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal’s (NCLAT) order affirming the National Company Law Tribunal’s (NCLT) admission of a Section 7, IBC application by REC Ltd. (Financial Creditor), initiating the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP).

The Appellant argued that the CIRP was barred under Section 10A, IBC, as the alleged default occurred during the protected period due to loan restructuring.

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC) – Order 41 Rule 22, Order 41 Rule 33 – Tamil Nadu Courts Fee and Suits Valuation Act, 1965 – Sections 3(i), 16, 52 – The case addressed the maintainability of a cross-objection in a first appeal without payment of ad valorem court fee. The cross-objector, Hameetha Beevi, sought relief in a specific performance suit where she was denied a share in the decree, despite claiming to be a legal heir of the deceased plaintiff. The trial court had granted specific performance but excluded her as she was not a party to the original agreement and had not joined as a co-plaintiff.

The High Court clarified that a cross-objection challenging the trial court’s decree, rather than merely an adverse finding, partakes the character of an appeal.

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Section 8, 9, and 11 – The case involves a dispute among partners of ‘M/s RDDHI Gold’ where the appellant contests the validity of an ‘Admission Deed’, claiming it’s forged. Respondent No. 1, Rajia Begum, asserts her entry into the firm based on this deed, which allegedly resulted in the retirement of respondents No. 2 and 3.

Dowry Death and Causing Death of Unborn Child

This appeal concerned Sections 304-B, 316, and 498-A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, with reference to Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.

The appellant, the mother-in-law, challenged her conviction under Sections 304-B and 316 IPC for the dowry death and causing the death of an unborn child of her daughter-in-law, Alka @ Pooja. The deceased died by suicide on August 3, 2011, approximately eight months after her marriage to the appellant’s son, Rahul, and was 34 weeks pregnant at the time. The prosecution alleged that the deceased was subjected to cruelty and harassment for a dowry demand of Rs.