Search Judgments

Right to Information Act, 2005 – Section 8(1)(d) – Direction to disclose bank’s OTS policy – Propriety.

This writ petition challenges an order by the Central Information Commission (CIC) directing a bank to disclose its One Time Settlement (OTS) policy. The CIC reasoned that disclosing the policy would be in the public interest and facilitate expeditious recovery of dues, as the borrower was a guarantor and needed the information to make a better settlement offer. The bank argued that disclosing the policy would harm its business interests, as it is an internal decision-making tool.

Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA) – Sections 3, 45, and 70 – Scope of “Offence of Money Laundering” against Directors without implicating Company in PMLA proceedings A company committing a scheduled (predicate) offense does not necessarily have to be implicated as an accused in a PMLA complaint if the directors or individuals are found to have committed the act of money laundering (concealment, possession, acquisition, or use of proceeds of crime) in their individual capacity. The offense of money laundering under Section 3 PMLA is distinct from the predicate offense and can be committed by any person involved with the proceeds of crime, regardless of their role in the company or their inclusion as an accused in the predicate offense.

Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA) – Section 70 – Distinction from Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (NI Act) and other penal statutes Unlike offenses under the NI Act or similarly worded provisions in other penal statutes where the company’s involvement as an accused is indispensable, Section 70 of PMLA allows for the prosecution of individuals (directors, etc.) for money laundering even if the company that committed the predicate offense is not arrayed as an accused in the PMLA complaint, especially if the proceeds of crime are traced to the individuals.

Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA) – Section 24 – Presumption against Accused Section 24 of PMLA creates a presumption that proceeds of crime are involved in money laundering, placing the burden of proving the contrary on the accused.

Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act) – Sections 7 & 8; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.P.C.) – Section 482; Constitution of India – Articles 32 & 136 – Quashing of FIR based on compromise – Sexual assault on child – Locus Standi of third party: Offence under POCSO Act, even if compromised, is a heinous crime against society, not merely private. High Court’s quashing of FIR under Section 482 Cr.P.C. based on compromise between accused teacher and victim’s father, in a case involving sexual assault on a minor, is erroneous. Public-spirited citizens have locus standi to challenge such orders under Article 136 of the Constitution.

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (Cr.P.C.) – Section 482 – Quashing of FIR – Compromise in POCSO Cases: The inherent power under Section 482 Cr.P.C.

Admiralty (Jurisdiction and Settlement of Maritime Claims) Act, 2017 – Sections 3, 4, 6, and 7
Commercial Courts Act, 2015 – Section 12A; Letters Patent Act 1956 Clause 32 – The case involves a suit filed as an admiralty action in personam to recover damages for a collision allegedly caused by the defendant. The defendant sought rejection of the plaint and revocation of leave to sue, primarily arguing that the collision occurred outside Indian territorial waters, the defendant doesn’t reside or carry on business within the court’s jurisdiction, and pre-institution mediation was not exhausted.

The plaintiff contended that the cause of action arose within the court’s jurisdiction due to subsequent events like lodging a police complaint and loss estimation. They argued that the claim qualifies as a maritime claim maintainable under Sections 6 and 7 of the Admiralty Act.

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) – Sections 498A, 304B, 306, 34 – Dowry Death – Cruelty – Abetment of Suicide – Common Intention The Supreme Court meticulously analyzes the ingredients of a “dowry death” under Section 304B IPC, particularly the crucial element of “cruelty or harassment… in connection with the demand for dowry” that must occur “soon before her death.” The Court holds that general statements of torture or harassment, or harassment related to an extramarital affair, are insufficient to establish the specific link to dowry demand required for a dowry death conviction. However, general cruelty and harassment compelling suicide can still lead to conviction under Section 498A (cruelty) and Section 306 (abetment of suicide) IPC.

Indian Evidence Act, 1872 – Section 113B – Presumption as to Dowry Death – Pre-requisites for Invocation The Court clarifies that the presumption under Section 113B of the Evidence Act can only be invoked if the foundational facts, especially the link between cruelty/harassment and dowry demand soon before death, are firmly established by the prosecution. Mere unnatural death within seven years of marriage is not sufficient.

Transfer of Property Act 1882 Section 3 – This second appeal arises from a dispute over property rights in Puducherry. The plaintiff filed a suit seeking to declare a power of attorney (POA) deed as null and void, arguing that the executants (defendants 1-3) had no title to the property. The plaintiff also sought permanent injunctions to prevent interference with his possession and to restrain registration/patta transfer/electricity service connection in the name of the defendants.

The trial court dismissed the suit, citing a bar under the Pondicherry Settlement Act, 1970, and non-joinder of necessary parties.

(Enforceability of Foreign Summary Judgment in India)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Sections 13, 44A); Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 (Section 47); Companies Act, 1956 (Sections 194, 210, 211, 215) - The Supreme Court examined the enforceability of a UK High Court's summary judgment in India, which stemmed from an External Commercial Borrowing (ECB) guaranteed by a foreign company (appellant) for an Indian company (respondent). The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) had approved this guarantee with a critical condition: "no liability whatsoever will extend to the Indian Company" upon invocation of the guarantee.

The English Court issued a summary judgment, denying the respondent leave to defend. The respondent had raised substantial defences, including oral agreements and statutory financial documents (Balance Sheets, Board Minutes), asserting no liability.

• Income Tax Act, 1961 – Reassessment under Section 147/148: Reassessment proceedings initiated after four years from the end of the relevant assessment year are valid only if there is a finding of failure on the part of the assessee to fully and truly disclose all material facts.
• Income Tax Act, 1961 – Reassessment on : The Assessing Officer cannot reopen a concluded assessment on the basis of a “mere change of opinion” on the same facts and materials that were already examined and considered during the original scrutiny assessment.
• Writ Jurisdiction – Article 226: The court can exercise its discretionary writ jurisdiction to interfere with reassessment proceedings if they are initiated without jurisdiction, such as when the statutory conditions precedent for reopening the assessment are not met.
• Jurisdictional Fact: The failure of the assessee to fully and truly disclose material facts is a “jurisdictional fact” required for reopening an assessment beyond the four-year period. The absence of such a finding in the reopening notice or order makes the entire proceeding invalid.

Final Decision:    The court set aside the reassessment proceedings, finding them to be without jurisdiction. The Assessing Officer’s action was based on a “mere change of opinion” on issues already examined during the original assessment and lacked a mandatory finding of the assessee’s failure to disclose material facts, which is required for reopening the assessment after four years.

Income Tax Act, 1961 – Sections 143(2), 142(1), 143(3), 148A(b), 148A(d), 148, 149(1)(b), 153A, 153C and 147 – The Income Tax department appealed against an order allowing a writ petition filed by the assessee company, challenging a notice issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, which sought to reopen the assessment for the assessment year 2017-18. The Assessing Officer (AO) had issued the notice based on information suggesting that income had escaped assessment, specifically related to processing charges, professional charges, and investments made by the assessee.

The assessee argued that the reopening was based on a mere change of opinion and was barred by limitation. The department contended that the amended provisions of the Act, effective from April 1, 2021, apply retrospectively, and the AO had sufficient information to warrant reopening.

• Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 – Section 2(b) & 12: Civil Contempt – Wilful Disobedience of Court Order. A party’s conduct, both before and after the issuance of a court order, can be considered to determine if the disobedience was wilful and intentional. A party who misleads the court and reaps benefits from a temporary order, only to later plead financial inability, is guilty of contempt.
• Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC) – Abuse of Process: A party that consistently seeks adjournments, files applications, and pursues litigation across various forums to retain possession of a property without fulfilling financial obligations, while a business is running, is misusing the judicial process. This amounts to a deliberate and mala fide act.
• Indian Constitution – Article 129: Power of Supreme Court to Punish for Contempt.