Search Judgments

Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860 – Sections 302 & 307 – This judgment concerns criminal appeals filed by accused 5, 2, and 3 challenging their conviction and sentence in S.C. No.40 of 2013. The accused were convicted under Sections 307 (attempt to murder) and 302 (murder) of the IPC. The case arose from a dispute related to a car festival, leading to a violent incident where the accused allegedly assaulted the complainant (PW1) and others, resulting in the death of one person.

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) – Section 19 & Section 20: When a suit is for compensation for damage to movable property, it can be filed either where the wrong occurred or where the defendant resides/carries on business. However, where an express agreement between the parties provides for a specific court’s jurisdiction, that clause will be valid if the chosen court is one of the courts that would otherwise have jurisdiction under the CPC.

Contract Law – Jurisdiction Clause: Parties to an agreement cannot, by consent, confer jurisdiction on a court that has no territorial jurisdiction under the law. However, if multiple courts have jurisdiction, the parties can agree to submit any disputes to one of those specific courts to the exclusion of others.

Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC) Section 311 – This case involves a Criminal Original Petition challenging an order that was passed in Crl.M.P.No.5 of 2025 in C.C.No.2732 of 2024, which dismissed an application to recall P.W.14 (an expert witness) for further cross-examination.

The petitioner (accused) argued that further cross-examination was necessary to address concerns about the tampering of electronic evidence presented by the prosecution, particularly regarding the cybercrime manual. The prosecution contended that the trial had been prolonged, P.W.14 had already been thoroughly cross-examined on relevant issues, and the application was a delaying tactic.

The court acknowledged that an accused should be given a fair chance to defend themselves, but emphasized that the purpose of recalling a witness is not to re-do the cross-examination for a better perspective.

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) – Section 302 (Murder) – Circumstantial Evidence – Last Seen Theory: In a case resting solely on circumstantial evidence, the “last seen” theory alone is insufficient for conviction, especially when the intervening period between being last seen and death is not so short as to rule out other possibilities. The prosecution must establish a complete chain of circumstances, without any missing links, that points conclusively to the accused’s guilt and excludes all other reasonable hypotheses.

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) – Section 201 (Causing disappearance of evidence of offence) – Subsequent Conduct: The subsequent conduct of an accused, such as removal of a dead body or concealment of evidence, is relevant under Section 8 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, for determining guilt under Section 201 IPC. However, such conduct, while indicative of a guilty mind regarding the disposal of evidence, does not automatically establish guilt for the primary offense like murder, especially when other crucial links in the chain of circumstances are missing.

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 – Section 138 – This criminal revision case was filed against the concurrent judgments of the trial court and the lower appellate court, which convicted the petitioner under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. The case originated from a dishonored cheque for Rs. 2,00,000 issued by the petitioner to the respondent, allegedly towards repayment of a loan.

The petitioner argued that the cheque was misused by the respondent, who was running a finance business under the name Mahalakshmi Finance.

• Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 – “Not of Standard Quality” Drug – Method of Analysis (Rule 46): The question of whether the Government Analyst correctly applied Rule 46 (specifically sub-rules (3) or (4)) of the Drugs Rules, 1945, for testing a non-pharmacopoeial, patent, or proprietary medicine, including the need to obtain the manufacturer’s testing procedure, is a disputed question of fact that cannot be resolved in a quash petition.
• Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 – Sanction for Prosecution – Screening Committee: A prosecution under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940, will not be quashed on the ground of absence of a Screening Committee or lack of its approval, if evidence (like committee proceedings) demonstrates that such a committee was constituted and its approval for prosecution was obtained prior to filing the complaint.
• Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 – Quashing of Complaint – Disputed Questions of Fact: A criminal complaint under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940, will not be quashed if the grounds for quashing involve disputed questions of fact that require adjudication during a trial, such as the proper method of drug analysis or the validity of the sanctioning process.
• Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 – Sanction for Prosecution – Absence vs. Invalidity: A formal sanction for prosecution under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act is generally not required unless the offense falls under Chapter IV A (Ayurvedic, Siddha, and Unani Drugs). Even if assumed necessary, the validity of a sanction order due to alleged non-application of mind cannot be adjudicated at the threshold (quash petition stage) but must be raised during the trial.
• Companies Act, 2013 – Liability of Managing Director – Vicarious Liability – Drugs and Cosmetics Act: For a Managing Director to be prosecuted for offenses committed by a company under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, there must be a specific averment in the complaint that they were “in charge and responsible to the company for the conduct of its business.” Merely holding the position of Managing Director is insufficient, especially when the company has specifically named technical staff responsible for manufacturing and quality control in its license.

Final Decision:     The quash petition filed by the company (Accused 1) is dismissed, as the grounds raised, including the delay in filing the complaint and the method of drug analysis, were found to be either legally untenable or requiring trial for adjudication. However, the quash petition filed by the Managing Director (Accused 2) is allowed, as the complaint lacked specific averments establishing his direct responsibility for the company’s day-to-day conduct or the manufacturing process of the impugned drug.

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Appeal for Enhancement of Compensation

The claimant, a minor aged about 7 years, sought enhancement of compensation awarded by the Tribunal for injuries sustained in a road accident. The Tribunal had awarded Rs. 1,94,651. The claimant argued that the compensation was inadequate, particularly regarding disability and inconvenience to the parents.

Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 – Section 2(c)(iii) and Supreme Court Rules, 2013 – Order IV Rule 10 – The Supreme Court addressed a case where a petitioner, N. Eswaranathan, filed a second Special Leave Petition (SLP) challenging the same High Court judgment after his first SLP was dismissed with a direction to surrender. The second SLP was filed through the same Advocate-on-Record (AOR), Mr. P.

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Section 147, 149 [Old], 150 [New], 163-A and 166 – The central question of law is whether Motor Accident Claims Tribunals can order “pay and recovery” against insurers for policy condition violations after the 2019 amendment that removed the proviso to old Section 149(4) and 149(5) (now Section 150) – The core issue revolves around the interpretation of Section 150(1) after the deletion of the proviso to the old Section 149(4) and Sub-Section (5) of the same section. The statutory liability of the insurer remains even if they have the right to avoid or cancel the policy against the insured. Section 150(2) enables the Motor Accident Claims Tribunals to adjudicate on the dispute between insurer and insured.

The court emphasized that the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 intends to provide compensation to road accident victims, even if the insured violated policy conditions.

Madras City Tenants Protection Act, 1921 – Section 9 and Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowment Act, 1959 – Section 34 – Applicability to Temple Lands – This writ petition contests the requirement of a No Objection Certificate (NOC) from a temple for registering a sale certificate issued under the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (SARFAESI Act).

The property in question was originally owned by the Temple, with a superstructure owned by a tenant.
The tenant successfully sought the purchase of the land under Section 9 of the Madras City Tenants Protection Act, resulting in a court-ordered sale deed in 1978. The bank, having sold the property under SARFAESI Act now faces registration hurdles due to the requirement of an NOC from the temple.