Search Judgments

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) – Section 376(2)(n) and Section 375 – This case concerns an appeal against the High Court’s refusal to quash proceedings stemming from an FIR filed under Section 376(2)(n) of the IPC, alleging rape on the false promise of marriage. The complainant, an advocate and married woman, alleged that the accused, also an advocate, established a physical relationship with her under the guise of marriage, later refusing to marry her and forcing her to abort their child. The accused, on the other hand, claimed the relationship was consensual and accused the complainant of blackmail.

The Supreme Court examined whether the FIR disclosed ingredients constituting an offence under Section 376(2)(n) of the IPC.

Trademarks Act, 1999 – Section 91 – This appeal was filed under Section 91 of the Trademarks Act, 1999, challenging the order of the 1st respondent (dated 09.05.2025) and seeking reinstatement of the appellant’s trademark registration (Certificate No.400179 dated 15.07.2005) for the trademark “SAKTHI” used on food products. The appellant had obtained registration for the mark in 2005, which was subsequently renewed.

In 2023, the appellant discovered that its registration had been unilaterally cancelled by the 1st respondent. This cancellation occurred without providing any prior notice or opportunity to be heard.

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) – Sections 302, 120-B, 201, 506 read with Section 34 – The case revolves around the alleged murder of Martandgouda, who went missing on 11.12.2011. A complaint was filed, and suspicions arose against several individuals, leading to charges of conspiracy, abduction, murder, and disposal of evidence. The Trial Court acquitted all accused due to a lack of an unbroken chain of circumstances proving guilt. The High Court overturned the acquittal, convicting accused nos.

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) – Section 302; Indian Evidence Act, 1872 – Section 32(1); Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.P.C) – Section 313 – This case involves an appeal by the State of Himachal Pradesh against a High Court judgment that acquitted the respondent, Chaman Lal, of the charge of murder under Section 302 of the IPC. The respondent was accused of pouring kerosene on his wife, Saro Devi, and setting her on fire, which led to her death. The trial court convicted him based on the dying declaration of the deceased.

The prosecution’s case hinged on the dying declaration recorded by the Tehsildar, which stated that the respondent had set her on fire after calling her names.

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) – Section 80 and Section 100 – This case involves a dispute over a pathway (“Nadugani Thadam”) providing access to the plaintiff’s (Lower Victoria Estate owner) property, situated within a reserve forest. The pathway, the only access to the estate, was damaged by floods in 1991, leading the plaintiff to seek its renovation. The Government (Forest Department) contested the claim, arguing the land was a protected forest, and the plaintiff had no right to renovate or use vehicles within it, citing the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980, and the Wildlife Protection Act, 1972.

The Trial Court decreed the suit partly, declaring the plaintiff’s right to use the pathway and permitting renovation at their cost.

Constitution of India – Article 226 – The petitioner challenged the denial of a 4% interest subsidy under the Technology Upgradation Fund Scheme (TUFS) for a Rs. 10 crore loan. The loan, availed in 2010 for modernization, was initially confirmed as eligible for TUFS benefits. However, the subsidy claim of Rs.

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (MVA) – Section 166 – This Civil Miscellaneous Appeal arose from a Motor Accident Claims Tribunal judgment awarding Rs. 1,13,81,664/- with 7.5% interest for the death of T. Vivekananthan in a motor accident on 05.04.2010. The deceased, a Senior Zonal Manager aged 43, was earning Rs.

Indian Evidence Act, 1872 – Sections 91, 92; Specific Relief Act, 1963 – Section 22 – The plaintiffs appealed the dismissal of their suit seeking specific performance of a sale agreement dated 07.10.2013, or alternatively, a refund of Rs. 15,00,000/- advance. The defendant contended the registered agreement (Ex.A1) was never intended as a genuine sale, but merely security for loans advanced by Mylsamy, father of the 1st plaintiff.

The Court examined if Ex.A1 was a genuine sale agreement or a security document.

Specific Relief Act, 1963 (SRA) – Section 22(2); Indian Contract Act, 1872 – Section 74; Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC) – Order 41 Rule 33 – The plaintiff sought specific performance of a 2004 sale agreement for land and a building. The trial court denied specific performance but suo motu ordered a refund of the advance amount. The plaintiff appealed the denial of specific performance.

The High Court found the plaintiff lacked continuous readiness and willingness, demonstrating unexplained delays of nearly two years in fulfilling obligations and raising property description issues belatedly.

The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) Order 41 Rule 27 – The Specific Relief Act, 1963 – This Second Appeal challenged the first appellate court’s reversal of a specific performance decree. The plaintiff’s deceased son had an agreement of sale with the defendant, paying Rs. 25,000 as advance for a property. Following his death, the plaintiff, as legal heir, sought specific performance under the Specific Relief Act, 1963.