Search Judgments

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Claim for Compensation – The appeal arises from the dismissal of a claim petition filed by the parents of the deceased, Shruthi Lavanya, who died in a road accident while riding pillion on a two-wheeler. The claimants sought compensation attributing negligence to the two-wheeler rider and vicarious liability to its owner and insurer.

The insurer contested the claim, arguing that the FIR indicated the lorry driver was the tort-feasor and should have been impleaded. The Tribunal dismissed the petition, concluding the accident resulted from the lorry driver’s negligence.

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 Section 166 – Compensation for Motor Accident – This case involves appeals against a judgment by the High Court of Karnataka, modifying an award by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal regarding a motor vehicle accident. The accident occurred on 19.11.2016, when the appellant’s Omni car collided with a parked lorry on the Peenya flyover in Bengaluru, resulting in grievous injuries to the appellant.

The Tribunal had initially awarded Rs. 17,01,140, reduced to Rs.

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) – Section 302 and Indian Evidence Act, 1872 – Section 27 – This case concerns an appeal against the conviction of the appellant under Section 302 of the IPC for the murder of Ramakrishnan. The prosecution’s case rested primarily on the testimony of two eyewitnesses, PW-4 and PW-5, who claimed to have seen the appellant stabbing the deceased.

The appellant’s counsel argued that the eyewitness accounts were unreliable due to significant omissions and contradictions. The counsel highlighted discrepancies in their statements regarding the number of stab wounds, their distance from the scene, and the presence of other witnesses who were not examined.

Indian Penal Code (IPC) – Section 302, Section 149, Arms Act Section 25(1b)(a) & Explosive Act Section 9B(1)(b) – This case revolves around the murder of Venkatesan, Chairman of Thali Panchayat Union, on 08.05.2002. The prosecution alleged that the accused, members of a left-wing organization, conspired to murder Venkatesan due to his refusal to pay donations. The attack involved a country bomb, sickles, and acid.

Initially, 15 individuals were accused, but trials were conducted separately for absconding accused later apprehended.

Transfer of Property Act, 1882 – Section 60; Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Order 34 Rules 7 & 11; Indian Evidence Act, 1872 – Section 101 – This case involves a Second Appeal filed against the judgment of the First Appellate Court, which had allowed the plaintiff’s (M.K.Kannan) suit for redemption of two mortgage deeds executed with the defendant (Park Town Benefit Fund Ltd). The plaintiff claimed to have repaid the mortgage amount, but the defendant disputed the same, leading to the initial dismissal of the suit by the trial court.

The core issue revolves around whether the plaintiff discharged the mortgage debt, the burden of proof for such discharge, and the applicable interest rate pendente lite. The High Court reformulated the substantial questions of law to address these points specifically, emphasizing the plaintiff’s responsibility under Section 101 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 to prove the repayments made.

Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) – Section 318(4) –  Petition for bail filed by individuals arrested and remanded to judicial custody for offenses under Section 318(4) of the BNS, 2023. The prosecution alleges that A1 (M.Karthick) opened a fake online trading app, inducing the complainant to deposit a significant sum of money, which was then siphoned off. Dhayanidhi, M.Karthick, Sakthinathan and Yesudass seeks bail.

M.Karthick and Sakthinathan ranked as A1 and A2 argued false implication and attachment of bank accounts.

Indian Contract Act, 1872 – Section 230; Indian Trusts Act 1882 – Section 88 – Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956 – The case involves two suits: C.S. No. 200 of 2006 filed by Dharmendra Bafna against C. Kishan Lal for recovery of Rs.1,83,72,162, and C.S.

(Banking Service Deficiency)

The Consumer Protection Act, 1986 Section 23 of  (now Section 67 of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019), and involving aspects of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (Sections 6, 25, 30, 64, 72, 75A, 84, 85, 105, 138, 142) and the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (Section 73), arose from two civil appeals filed by Canara Bank against the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission's decision.

The respondent, Kavita Chowdhary, deposited two CTS cheques totaling Rs. 1,06,10,768.00 into her savings account with Canara Bank on May 29, 2018. Both cheques, dated March 3, 2018, were drawn on Vijaya Bank.

Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (SARFAESI Act) Section 13(2) and Section 13(3A); The Constitution of India Article 227  – This petition was filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India challenging the order of the Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal, which upheld the dismissal of the petitioners’ (borrowers) Securitisation Application (SA). The SA was filed against proceedings initiated under the SARFAESI Act due to loan default. The bank had issued a notice under Section 13(2), taken symbolic possession, and sold the secured asset via auction.

The petitioners raised several objections, including defects in the sale notice regarding the 15-day notice period, property description, valuation report validity, and non-compliance with Section 13(3A) of the SARFAESI Act.

Civil Procedure Code (CPC) – Order VI Rule 16 – Representation of the People Act, 1951 – Sections 77, 83, 123, 126 – This application was filed under Order VI Rule 16 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC) to strike off specific paragraphs from an election petition. The election petition sought to declare the Chennai Central Loksabha Parliament Constituency election void, alleging it was unfair, influenced by corrupt practices, and involved suppressed or excessive campaign spending violating Section 77 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951.

The petitioner alleged the candidate violated Section 126 by publishing advertisements during the “silence period,” failed to account for stickers displaying the candidate’s image, and did not report expenses for booth agents and a rally, all amounting to corrupt practices under Section 123. The applicant argued that the advertisements were published by the party, not the candidate, and were pre-certified.