M. Rajendran Vs. Sornamani
This Product is Licensed to :
R.N. MANJULA, J.
1. This Criminal Appeal is taken up under the caption ”’ for maintainability”’.
2. As per the Notification No.172 of 2025, dated 04.07.2025, issued by the Principal seat of this Court, the Registry has been directed not to entertain any petition to grant leave under Section 378(4) Cr.P.C against an order of acquittal for the offence under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act. However, a cut-off date has been fixed as 07.07.2025. The present appeal has been filed under Sec.378(4) Cr.P.C after the cut-off date i.e, 07.07.2025 and hence the maintainability point has been taken up.
3. It is submitted that the order in SPAC Tapioca Products (I) Ltd Vs. Arun Casuals India Ltd., and two others in Crl.O.P.No.27089 and 27094 of 2024 in Crl.A.SR.Nos.49576 and 59577 of 2024 has been passed by a Hon’ble Judge of a co-ordinate bench on 30.06.2025, in pursuant to the judgment of the Supreme Court held in M/s.Celestium Financial Vs. A.Gnanasekaran reported in 2025 SCC Online 1320. While passing the said order, a direction has been given to the registry to issue a circular that no petition seeking leave to file an appeal under Section 378(4) Cr.P.C to challenge the order of acquittal for the offence under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act should be received by the registry after 07.07.2025.
4. However, the learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the Hon”’ble Supreme Court in Celestium”’s case has not denied the right of the complainant to file an appeal against the judgment of acquittal on a private complaint for the offence under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act under Section 378 (4); adding to the above, the complainant has been considered as a victim under the Negotiable Instruments Act and hence the Hon’ble Supreme Court has also given liberty to the complainant to file an appeal under the proviso to Section 372 Cr.P.C., also.
5. So it is claimed that the complainant being the appellant can choose to file an appeal against judgment of acquittal for the offence under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act, either under Section 378(4) Cr.P.C (Section 419(4) of BNSS) or the under proviso to Section 372 Cr.P.C (Section 413 of BNSS).
6. Before adverting into the discussions on the above judgment of the Hon”’ble Supreme Court, I feel it is essential to understand the background in which Proviso to Section 372 has been inserted through the Criminal Procedure Code Amendment, 2008, which came into effect from 31.12.2009.
7. Originally, as how the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 stood, appeals can be filed against the order of acquittal under Section 417 Cr.P.C only at the instance of the State. So far as the order of acquittal passed in a case arising out of a complaint other than the police report, the complainant has a remedy only by way of filing a revision and not an appeal.
8. By virtue of the Criminal Procedure Code amendment Act, 1955, a new Section 417(3) Cr.P.C has been introduced. As per the newly constituted Section 417(3) Cr.P.C, the complainant can also file an appeal against the order of acquittal subject to grant of special leave by the High Court. However, there is no change with regard to the entitlement of the victim to prefer an appeal and the victims have to be at the mercy of the State. When the new Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, came into effect, Section 417 was replaced by Section 378. Even then, victim has no other remedy except to file a revision under Section 397 Cr.P.C, subject to certain limitations prescribed under Section 401(3) Cr.P.C.
9. The Law Commission in its 150th report had highlighted the plight of the victim, who had prosecuted through a police complaint. Similar news were expressed by the Malimath Committee also. Subsequently the Criminal Procedure Code amendment Act, 2006 brought out by having provisions protecting the interest of the victims of crime. Eventually, the Criminal Procedure Code amendment Act, 2008, which came into force on 31.12.2009, defined the “victim “ under Section 2(wa) and added a proviso to Section 372.
10. In effect, the Criminal Procedure Code amendment Act, 2008, paved way for filing appeals (i) at the instance of the State Government; (ii) appeals at the instance of the victim of crime; and (iii) appeals by the complainant. For the sake of clarity, proviso to Section 372 Cr.P.C is extracted herein under:
372. No appeal to lie unless otherwise provided.—No appeal shall lie from any judgment or order of a Criminal Court except as provided for by this Code by any other law for the time being in force:
Provided that the victim shall have a right to prefer an appeal against any order passed by the Court acquitting the accused or convicting for a lesser offence or imposing inadequate compensation, and such appeal shall lie to the Court to which an appeal ordinarily lies against the order of conviction of such Court.
11. The other provision under Section 378(4) Cr.P.C is also given under for the purpose of better understanding:
”378(4) If such an order of acquittal is passed in any case instituted upon complaint and the High Court, on an application made to it by the complainant in this behalf, grants special leave to appeal from the order of acquittal, the complainant may present such an appeal to the High Court.
12.As stated already in the year 2014, two learned single Judges of this Court have taken contrary views in construing ”’complainant”’ under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act as ”’victim”’ defined under Section 2(wa) of the Criminal Procedure Code. Only in view of that, a Full Bench was constituted in S.Ganapathy Vs. N.Senthilvel (reported in 2016 SCC Online Mad.16417), in order to deal with the following questions:
”1. Whether a victim of a crime, who has prosecuted an accused by way of a private complaint, does not have statutory right of appeal against acquittal under proviso to Section 372 of the Code of Criminal Procedure ?
2. Whether a complainant, in a private compliant case, who is not a victim, has got the remedy to seek only leave to file appeal under Section 378(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure in the event of acquittal of the accused ?
3. In a private complaint case, if a victim does not happen to be a complainant and in the event of acquittal, whether he has got right of appeal under proviso to Section 372 of the Code of Criminal Procedure or he has to seek leave to file appeal under Section 378(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure ?
4. Whether a victim in a case instituted on a police report, has a better place in the criminal justice delivery system than a victim in a private complaint case ?
5. Whether the term ?victim? as defined in Section 2(wa) of the Code of Criminal Procedure excludes a complainant in a private complaint case, though he has suffered loss or injury on account of the offence committed against him ? And
6. Whether the view held in the judgment of this Court in Selvaraj vs. Venkatachalapathy reported in 2015(1) MWN (Cr) DCC 26 (Mad.), reflects correct exposition of law or the same requires to be overruled?”
13. After making a survey of decisions of this Court and the Supreme Court, the Hon”’ble Full Bench has given the following answers.
(1) A victim of the crime, who has prosecuted an accused by way of a private complaint, has a statutory right of appeal within the limits prescribed under Section 372 of Cr.P.C.
(2) A complainant (in a private complaint), who is not a victim, has a remedy and can file an appeal in the event of acquittal of the accused after obtaining leave to appeal under Section 378(4) of Cr.P.C.
(3) In a private complaint, even if the victim is not a complainant, he has a right to appeal under the proviso to Section 372 of Cr.P.C. but he has to seek leave as held by the Supreme Court in Satyapal Singh.
(4) The term “victim” has been correctly interpreted by the Full Bench of the Delhi High Court in Ramphal and we are in agreement with the same.
(5) A victim (as defined under Section 2(wa) of the Cr.P.C. does not cease to be a victim merely because he also happens to be a complainant and he can avail all the rights and privileges of a victim also; and 5
(6) The decision of the Single Judge in Selvaraj holding that the term “victim” found in Section 372 excludes a complainant, is not legally correct and in a given case, a complainant, who is also a victim, can avail right granted under Section 372 of Cr.P.C”
14. The very same matter came to be referred once again by a Full Bench in K.Rajalingam Vs. R.Suganthalakshmi reported in 2020 (4) CTC 1, when an another learned single Judge has raised doubts on the decision of the Full Bench in S.Ganapathy”’s case (cited supra). This is especially in the context of the judgment of the Hon”’ble Supreme Court held in Mallikarjun Kodagali vs. State of Karnataka reported in 2019(2) SCC 752. The relevant portion of the above judgment of the Hon”’ble Supreme Court is extracted as under:
”76. As far as the question of the grant of special leave is concerned, once again, we need not be overwhelmed by submissions made at the Bar. The language of the proviso to Section 372 CrPC is quite clear, particularly when it is contrasted with the language of Section 378(4) CrPC. The text of this provision is quite clear and it is confined to an order of acquittal passed in a case instituted upon a complaint. The word “complaint” has been defined in Section 2(d) CrPC and refers to any allegation made orally or in writing to a Magistrate. This has nothing to do with the lodging or the registration of an FIR, and therefore it is not at all necessary to consider the effect of a victim being the complainant as far as the proviso to Section 372 Cr.PC is concerned”
15. So, the Hon”’ble Full Bench in K.Rajalingam”’s case declared the law laid down by the earlier Full Bench in Ganapathy”’s case is per incuriam. It was observed that Ganapathy”’s case was contrary to the law laid down by the Hon”’ble Supreme Court in Damodar S.Prabhu vs. Sayed Babalal H reported in 2010 (5) SCC 663. It is relevant to extract paragraph No.20 as under:
20. It may be noted here that Section 143 of the Act makes an offence under Section 138 triable by a Judicial Magistrate, First Class (JMFC). After trial, the progression of further legal proceedings would depend on whether there has been a conviction or an acquittal.
In the case of conviction, an appeal would lie to the Court of Sessions under Section 374(3)(a) CrPC; thereafter a revision to the High Court under Sections 397/401 CrPC and finally a petition before the Supreme Court, seeking special leave to appeal under Section 136 of the Constitution of India. Thus, in case of conviction there will be four levels of litigation.
In the case of acquittal by JMFC, the complainant could appeal to the High Court under Section 378(4) CrPC, and thereafter for special leave to appeal to the Supreme Court under Article 136. In such an instance, therefore, there will be three levels of proceedings.
16.Damodar S.Prabhu”’s case has settled that the complainant in a case under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act can file an appeal against the order of acquittal under Section 378(4) Cr.P.C, but only after seeking special leave. However in the recent judgment of M/s. Celestium Financial Vs. A.Gnanasekaran reported in 2025 SCC Online 1320, the Hon”’ble Supreme Court has held that the complainant for a case under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act can also be construed as victim and hence such complainant can file an appeal under proviso to Section 372 Cr.P.C.
17. The Hon”’ble Supreme Court has concluded in Celestium”’s case that the complainants of the cases falling under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act can prefer an appeal either under the proviso to Section 372 Cr.P.C or under Section 378(4) Cr.P.C.
18.Thus, the judgment of the Hon”’ble Supreme Court rendered in Celestium”’s case has crystallized the dual appeal remedy to the complainant by holding that the complainant can make use of proviso to Section 372 Cr.P.C or Section 378(4) Cr.P.C for the purpose of filing an appeal against an order of acquittal.
19. One fundamental difference between Section 378(4) Cr.P.C and proviso to Section 372 Cr.P.C is that the appeal under Section 378(4) Cr.P.C can be filed only before the High Court after obtaining special leave. But, the appeal filed under proviso to Section 372 Cr.P.C will lie before the Sessions Court like a regular appeal. In other words, appeals filed by invoking proviso to Section 372 Cr.P.C does not require leave of the court. In fact, it has been the observation of the Hon”’ble Supreme Court also in para No.7.11 of the judgment in Celestium”’s case:
”7.11. A reading of section 378 would clearly indicate that in case the complainant intends to file an appeal against the order of acquittal, his right is circumscribed by certain conditions precedent. When an appeal is to be preferred by a complainant, the first question is, whether, the complainant is also the victim or only an informant. If the complainant is not a victim and the case is instituted upon a complaint, then sub-section (4) requires that the complainant must seek special leave to appeal from an order of acquittal from the High Court. As noted under sub-section (6), if the application under subsection (4) for grant of special leave to appeal from the order of acquittal is refused, no appeal from that order of acquittal would lie, inter alia, under sub-section (1) of Section 378. However, if the complainant is also a victim, he could proceed under the proviso to Section 372, in which case the rigour of sub-section (4) of Section 378, which mandates obtaining special leave to appeal, would not arise at all, as he can prefer an appeal as a victim and as a matter of right. Thus, if a victim who is a complainant, proceeds under Section 378, the necessity of seeking special leave to appeal would arise but if a victim whether he is a complainant or not, files an appeal in terms of proviso to Section 372, then the mandate of seeking special leave to appeal would not arise”.
20. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the above relief granted by the Hon”’ble Supreme Court in Celestium”’s case is to pursue a remedy before two forums and it has not given two different remedies. So it is submitted that the doctrine of election would not apply as there is no multiple remedies, but the accommodation of two different forums have been granted for entertaining the request for a same remedy. To put it more clearly, the entitlement of the complainant to file an appeal under proviso to Section 372 Cr.P.C or Section 378(4) Cr.P.C are not two different remedies, but, only one remedy of appeal by granting options to the appellant to choose to prefer an appeal either before the Sessions Court under proviso to Section 372 Cr.P.C or before the High Court under Section 378(4) Cr.P.C.
21. The learned counsel also submitted that granting of dual forums in Celestium”’s case is contrary to the earlier decisions of the Hon”’ble Supreme Court held in Mallikarjun Kodagali”’s case and Damodar S.Prabhu”’s case. Because, in Mallikarjun Kodagali”’s case, the Hon”’ble Supreme Court has held that complainant need not be considered as a person having an effect of a ”’victim”’ for the purpose of proviso to Section 372 Cr.P.C.
22. In the earlier Full Bench in Damodar S.Prabhu”’s case, the Hon”’ble Supreme Court has settled that the cases falling under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act will have four levels from the conviction judgment of the trial court and three levels from the acquittal judgment. So, in the event of a case under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act ends in acquittal before the Court of the Judicial Magistrate, the appeal remedy would lie to the High Court under Section 378(4) Cr.P.C and thereafter, to the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution of India on a special leave to appeal. Now, by accommodating the complainant to file an appeal by invoking proviso to Section 372 Cr.P.C before the Sessions Court would be adding one more tier as similar as that of the judgment of conviction passed by the Magistrate.
23. The learned single Judge of the co-ordinate bench in SPAC Tapioca Products (I) Ltd Vs. Arun Casuals India Ltd., and two others in Crl.O.P.No.27089 and 27094 of 2024 in Crl.A.SR.Nos.49576 and 59577 of 2024 held that complainants of Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act cases can only file an appeal by invoking proviso to Section 372 Cr.P.C and not under Section 378(4)Cr.P.C. In this regard, a Notification dated 04.07.2025 has already been issued not to entertain such petitions seeking grant of leave of the court for the appeals filed under Section 378(4)Cr.P.C from 07.07.2025.
24. While passing the order to issue the above Circular, the learned single Judge has observed that as the Supreme Court has given liberty to the complainants to file an appeal against the order of acquittal, by assuming the status of victims, by invoking proviso to Section 372 Cr.P.C, they need not advert to sub-section(4) of Section 378 Cr.P.C. Since many appeals have been filed under Section 378(4) Cr.P.C by obtaining leave of this Court even after the judgment of Celestium”’s case, the learned single Judge thought it fit to fix the outer time limit as 07.07.2025 and directed the Registry to issue a Circular not to entertain any petition to grant leave and by directing the District Courts to entertain the appeals arising out of the judgments of acquittal under proviso to Section 372 Cr.P.C.
25. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that, the liberty given to the complainants of the complaints filed under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act in Celestium, for filing an appeal under proviso to Section 372 Cr.P.C, will not take away their statutory right to file an appeal under Section 378(4) Cr.P.C. In other words, the statutory right of the appellant to file an appeal under Section 378(4) Cr.P.C is not lost, just because he has also got an another forum under the proviso to sec.372 Cr.P.C.
26.Now it has to be understood whether the judgment of the Hon”’ble Supreme Court held in Celestium”’s case allowing the complainants of the Negotiable Instruments Act to file an appeal under proviso to Section 372 Cr.P.C is either optional or compulsive. One benefit that accrues to the complainant to choose to file an appeal under proviso to Section 372 Cr.P.C is that, he can straight away file an appeal without getting the leave of the court.
27. The liberty given to the complainants in Celestium,in my understanding is not with an intention to confer a double remedy to the appellant, but to accommodate more than one forum. The unsuccessful complainants of Negotiable Instruments Act can either file a direct appeal without leave under the proviso to Section 372 Cr.P.C or file an appeal under Section 378(4) Cr.P.C subject to leave.
28. If the complainant chooses to file an appeal under proviso to Section 372 Cr.P.C before the Sessions Court, he cannot once again file an appeal under Section 378(4) Cr.P.C before the High Court. As rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellant, the judgment of the Celestium”’s case did not create a situation for the unsuccessful complainant of Negotiable Instruments Act to choose two remedies. The remedy is always one, which is nothing but the right to file an appeal. So the question of application of doctrine of election will not arise in this situation. There is no compulsion placed on the appellants to choose between two remedies as they do not have two remedies at all. All that the complainant can do in pursuant to the judgment of Celestium is to just choose between two forums.
29. The situation can be further elaborated by visualizing a police complaint given by a third party, who is not a victim. In such cases, third party sets the law in motion, though the aggrieved person might be someone else. In such matters, if the case ends in acquittal, third party/ defacto complainant may not be interested in taking up an appeal against acquittal. So the victim”’s right needs to be protected and thus, the law has evolved by accommodating such victims under the proviso to Section 372 Cr.P.C. 11
30. According to the well settled principles on precedents, if there is conflict of decisions between the two judgments of the Hon”’ble Supreme Court, the judgment of the larger bench has to be followed and not the later smaller bench. The Full Bench judgment of the Hon”’ble Supreme Court held in Damodar S. Prabhu”’s case has already held that the appeal against acquittal does not lie to the Sessions Court under proviso to Section 372 Cr.P.C. The judgment in Damodar S.Prabhu”’s case has been held on 03.05.2010. In Celestium case, there was no reference about Damodar S.Prabhu”’s case.
31. The Hon”’ble Division Bench of the Supreme Court in Celestium”’s case has made reference to Mallikarjun Kodagali”’s case especially paragraph Nos.74 to 76, but proceeded to apply the same in the context of victim”’s right to file an appeal without seeking leave. But in the judgment of Mallikarjun Kodagali”’s case in paragraph No.76, a distinction has been made between the complaint made to the Magistrate by invoking private complaint procedure and the police complaint given by the defacto complainant to cause an FIR registered. By making the said contrast, it is observed in the judgment in Mallikarjun Kodagali”’s case that it is not at all necessary to consider the effect of a victim being the complainant as far as the proviso to Section 372 Cr.P.C is concerned.
32. So the above observation can be understood that irrespective of a victim being a complainant in a police report or not, he/she has the remedy to file an appeal against the order of acquittal by invoking proviso to Section 372 Cr.P.C. That is not applicable to the complaint defined under Section 2(d) of Cr.P.C which excludes a police report. Despite the Hon”’ble Supreme Court in Celestium”’s case extracted the proviso to Section 2(d) Cr.P.C and the private complaint under Section 200 Cr.P.C, the observation made in the judgment in Mallikarjun Kodagali”’s case with regard to private complainants other than police report in the context of victim has not been considered.
33. Even among the judgments of the equal strength, if there is a conflict, the later judgment of the equivalent bench has to be followed. The judgment in Celestium”’s case was held by a smaller bench and the judgment of Damodar S.Prabhus”’s case has been held by a larger bench of the Hon”’ble Supreme Court.
34. So far as the High Court of Madras is concerned, the later Full Bench in K.Rajalingam”’s case by making a reference to both Damodar S.Prabhu”’s case and Mallikarjun Kodagali”’s case, has settled the legal position that, an appeal against the order of acquittal passed by a Magistrate on a complaint will lie only before the High Court under Section 378(4) Cr.P.C and for which special leave should be obtained under Section 378(5)Cr.P.C. In fact, the said judgment has held that the earlier judgment in S.Ganapathy”’s case is per incuriam. As on today, the judgment of the Full Bench rendered in K.Rajalingam”’s case is still binding as it has not been set aside by the Hon”’ble Supreme Court.
35. Under such circumstances, the circular issued in pursuant to the directions of this court made in SPAC Tapioca Products (I) Ltd Vs. Arun Casuals India Ltd., and two others in Crl.O.P.No.27089 and 27094 of 2024 in Crl.A.SR.Nos.49576 and 59577 of 2024 may not be compatible with the position settled in K.Rajalingam by the full bench of this court.
36. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the respondent that the remedy under Section 378(4) Cr.P.C is a statutory remedy, and it cannot be taken away through a judgment. In this regard, reference has also been made to the judgment in A.R.Antulay Vs. R.S.Nayak(1988 (2) SCC 602) and the relevant portion of the judgment is extracted herein under:
”Shri Jethmalani sought to urge before us that the order made by the Court was not without jurisdiction or irregular. We are unable to agree. It appears to us that the order was quite clearly per incuriam. this Court was not called upon and did not decide the express limitation on the power conferred by Section 407 of the Code which includes offences by public servants mentioned in the 1952 Act to be overridden in the manner sought to be followed as the consequential direction of this Court. this Court, to be plain, did not have jurisdiction to transfer the case to itself. That will be evident from an analysis of the different provisions of the Code as well as the 1952 Act. The power to create or enlarge jurisdiction is legislative in character, so also the power to confer a right of appeal or to take away a right of appeal. Parliament alone can do it by law and no Court, whether superior or inferior or both combined can enlarge the jurisdiction of a Court or divest a person of his rights of revision and appeal”
37. Preventing the unsuccessful complainants under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act from invoking their right under Section 378(4)Cr.P.C, would in a way amount to limiting the appeals under Section 378(4)Cr.P.C only for the cases arising out of the police complaints. This is against the legal position already settled by the Full Bench of this Court in K.Rajalingam”’s case.
38. Even in Celestium”’s case though the complainants were given liberty to file an appeal under proviso to Section 372 Cr.P.C, it did not take away the rights available to them under Section 378(4) Cr.P.C. The spirit of the judgment of Celestium”’s case appears to be allowing the complainant under the Negotiable Instruments Act to conveniently file an appeal under proviso to Section 372 Cr.P.C without waiting to get the leave of the court. In other words, in Celestium”’s case, the Supreme Court has only held that, the right to file an appeal by the unsuccessful complainant of the Negotiable Instruments Act is automatic and hence, no permission is needed. It is up to individual unsuccessful complainant to decide either to go on appeal under the proviso to Section 372 Cr.P.C by taking advantage of Celestium”’s case or to seek regular recourse to appeal under Section 378(4) Cr.P.C. If a litigant gets two forums for exercising his right to file an appeal, it can be insisted to file an affidavit that he had not filed appeal in the other forum also.
39. Even after the judgment of Celestium”’s case appeals have been filed by the unsuccessful complainant of the Negotiable Instruments Act under Section 378(4)Cr.P.C before this Court by obtaining leave. As the Circular issued pursuant to the direction of the learned single Judge limits, the right of unsuccessful complainant of Negotiable Instruments Act only to file an appeal under the proviso to Section 372 Cr.P.C, which is contrary to the Full Bench judgment held in K.Rajalingam”’s case.
40. When a litigant gets two forums to exercise one right, namely the right to file an appeal, he needs to file an affidavit that he has chosen only one forum to file his appeal and also that he will not file an appeal once again before the other forum, in case his appeal filed before one forum has got dismissed or leave to file appeal rejected.
41. As the validity of the circular of the High Court which fixed the cut off as 04.07.2025 has not been challenged and revoked, it is not be possible for the registry to receive the appeals filed under sec.378(4) Cr.P.C. So the bottle neck can be removed only if the circular is revoked, modified or recalled. However, this appellant who is not a party to the Crl.O.P.Nos.27089 or 27094 of 2024 in Crl.A.SR.Nos.49576 and 59577 of 2024 and hence he may find it difficult to initiate any such proceedings.
42. Now, in order to mellow down the present difficulty, I feel this appellant can prefer an application before the Hon’ble Co-ordinate bench which issued the direction for issuing the circular, to implead himself as party either in Crl.O.P.Nos.27089 and 27094 of 2024 and Crl.A.SR.Nos.49576 and 59577 of 2024 in order to enable him to file an application seeking to recall or modify the order directing the circular to be issued to the registrar of this court on 30.06.2025, in the light of the discussions and observation now made in this order after making reference to various earlier pronouncements and principles.
43. Even though this appellant might not be an interested party to the proceedings in which the direction for issuance of the circular is given, he is also affected party due to the far reaching consequence of the circular issued pursuant to the order dated 30.06.2025 passed in Crl.O.P.Nos.27089 and 27094 of 2024 in Crl.A.SR.Nos.49576 and 59577 of 2024. Hence he can find it difficult to implead himself in the above proceedings by filing an application to that effect and thereafter to prefer an application for recalling or modifying the order dated 30.06.2025 made in Crl.O.P.Nos.27089 and 27094 of 2024 in Crl.A.SR.Nos.49576 and 59577 of 2024, as it relates to issuance of direction to the registry for issuing the circular by fixing the cut off date as 04.07.2025 and resolve the situation quicker and smoother.
With the above observations, this SR Criminal Original Petition is closed. Let the registry wait to number the criminal appeal and criminal original petition subject to the production of the order, if any, obtained by the applicant for recalling/modifying the order dated 30.06.2025 in Crl.O.P.Nos. 27089 and 27094 of 2024 in Crl.A.SR.Nos. 49576 and 59577 of 2024, specifically with regard to the notification of this Court dated 04.07.2025 (which arose out of the above order dated 30.06.2025).
